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ABSTRACT 
This Comment critiques the court of appeals’ statutory interpretation of 
Alaska’s hunting laws in Kinmon v. State and proposes legislative reform to 
correct those judicially created errors. Kinmon arose from a series of hunts 
between 2009 and 2011 during which nonresident hunters did not pay for their 
big game tags until after the completion of their hunts. The guide leading these 
hunts was charged with violating section 16.05.340(a)(15) of the Alaska 
Statutes, which prohibits nonresidents from hunting big game without 
“previously purchasing” a big game tag. The Alaska Court of Appeals held in 
favor of the guide, reasoning that “previously purchasing” was ambiguous and 
could be understood to permit purchase of a big game tag after a hunt. This 
reading of the statute is faulty under the plain meaning canon of statutory 
construction and has deleterious policy implications. To address this error, this 
Comment proposes a legislative amendment to section 16.06.340(a)(15) of the 
Alaska Statutes to clarify that “previously purchasing” a game tag requires 
purchase prior to a hunt. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is, by some accounts, the most hunter-friendly state in the 
nation.1 Hunting is central to the state’s culture, both traditionally2 and 
contemporaneously.3 Hunting not only enriches Alaska’s culture, it also 
contributes to the state’s coffers: in 2019, Alaska netted nearly $40 million 
from the sale of fishing and hunting licenses, stamps, and tags.4 Over $7.5 
million of that revenue came from the sale of nonresident big game tags.5 
However, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ decision in Kinmon v. State6 
threatens this valuable source of revenue and oversight created by the big 
game tag system. 
The State charged Richard Kinmon, a licensed big game hunter,7 
with violating section 16.05.340(a)(15) of the Alaska Statutes 8 following a 
series of hunts between 2009 and 2011.9 During these hunts, Kinmon 
allegedly allowed his clients to take game without “previously 
purchasing” big game tags.10 At trial, Kinmon argued the statutory 
meaning of “previously purchasing” could reasonably be understood to 
include the provision of a tag with a promise to pay in the future, after a 
hunt.11 The jury was presumably unconvinced by this argument as it 
convicted Kinmon on eight counts that turned, in part, on the phrase’s 
 
 1.  Kyle Hey, Top 10 Most Hunter Friendly States, BOWHUNTING.COM (July 24, 
2019), https://www.bowhunting.com/blog/2019/07/24/top-10-most-hunter-
friendly-states/; see also Ben O’Brien, HUNTING Ranks the Best States for Meat 
Eaters, PETERSEN’S HUNTING (Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.petersenshunting.com 
/editorial/hunting-ranks-best-states-meat-eaters/272907. 
 2.  See generally Jeffrey W. Stowers, Jr., A Starving Culture: Alaskan Native 
Villages’ Fight to Use Traditional Hunting and Fishing Grounds, 40 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
41 (2015) (describing the historical importance of subsistence hunting to Alaska 
Native culture and the threat to that way of life presented by the modern legal 
regime).  
 3.  See Jon Schuppe, The Fight over Alaska’s Hunting Rules Run Deeper than 
Doughnuts to Bait Bears, NBC NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/fight-over-alaska-s-hunting-rules-runs-deeper-using-
doughnuts-n882811 (describing unique features of Alaska’s contemporary 
recreational and subsistence hunting culture in relation to changes in federal land 
regulation under the Trump Administration). 
 4.  DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, 2019 CALENDAR YEAR LICENSES AND TAGS ISSUED 
(2020), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/license/pdfs/licenses_stamps_tags_ 
issued_2019.pdf. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  451 P.3d 392 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019). 
 7.  Under Alaska law, ‘big game’ includes black, brown, and grizzly bears, 
bison, caribou, elk, goats, moose, sheep, and wolves. ALASKA STAT. § 08.54.790(2) 
(2018). 
 8.  Id. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (2018). 
 9.  Kinmon, 451 P.3d 392 at 394.  
 10.  Id. at 396. 
 11.  Id. at 394. 
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definition.12 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed four of those counts 
based upon a construction of “previously purchasing” under which a 
binding promise to pay after a hunt is sufficient to satisfy the statute’s 
requirements.13 
This Comment critiques the holding in Kinmon from both a legal and 
a policy perspective. As such, the Alaska legislature should correct the 
error of Kinmon by clarifying the statutory meaning of “previously 
purchasing.” In making this argument, this Comment first presents 
Alaska’s well-established canons of statutory construction and introduces 
Alaska’s big game hunting laws in Part II. Part III then describes Kinmon 
in more detail to contextualize the application of those canons to the 
statutory scheme. Finally, Part IV shows that a proper application of the 
canons and salient policy considerations merit legislative action to correct 
the error in Kinmon. Specifically, the legislature should statutorily clarify 
that big game tags must be purchased prior to the commencement of a 
hunt. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To fully comprehend why Kinmon was wrongly decided, it is critical 
to both understand the tools of statutory construction that were misused 
and appreciate the statutory scheme to which those tools were 
misapplied. As to the former consideration, the court found the statute’s 
language sufficiently ambiguous to merit applying the rule of lenity.14 
This most-straightforward of canons, the “plain meaning rule,” is well 
known and used throughout the nation’s various judicial systems.15 In 
Alaska, the core of the rule is constructing statutes in accordance with 
their common usage.16 Put bluntly, “[u]nless otherwise defined, words 
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
 
 12.  Id. at 396. 
 13.  Id. at 399. 
 14.  The court determined that “if a statute is unresolvably [sic] ambiguous 
following [plain meaning] analysis, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed 
in the defendant’s favor.” Id. at 397. The court then found that “previously 
purchas[ed] could reasonably be construed to encompass the delivery of goods 
with a binding promise to pay in the near future” and applied the rule of lenity. 
Id. at 399.  
 15.  See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381 (2014) (quoting Hartford 
Underwrites, Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). “When 
[a] statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts – at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it according to its 
terms.” Id. 
 16.  See, e.g., Homer Elec. Ass’n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1043–44 (Alaska 
1992). 
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meaning.”17 The plain meaning of a statutory term may be further 
clarified by legislative history and the term’s context in a larger statutory 
scheme.18 To this end, Alaska courts use a “sliding scale” approach in 
which the plainer the statutory language, the more convincing contrary 
legislative history must be to negate that plain meaning.19 In the criminal 
context, if, after applying this analysis, “the legislature’s intent cannot be 
ascertained or remains ambiguous,” then the rule of lenity is applied.20 A 
court applying the rule construes the ambiguous statute in favor of the 
defendant.21 
In Kinmon, these interpretive canons were improperly applied to the 
statutory scheme governing the regulation of hunting in Alaska.22 
Specifically, the court of appeals applied them to section 16.05.340(a)(15) 
of the Alaska Statutes.23 Under that statute, nonresidents are prohibited 
from hunting big game without “previously purchasing” a big game 
tag.24 The significance of this statute is hard to understate as nonresidents 
have purchased sixty-seven percent of all big game tags sold in Alaska 
since 1977.25 In the past decade, tags purchased by nonresidents 
accounted for $43,873,055, or approximately ninety-seven percent of the 
 
 17.  State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 265, 272 (Alaska 2000). 
 18.  See, e.g., FDIC v. Laidlaw Transit, 21 P.3d 344, 351 (Alaska 2001) (quoting 
Homer Elec. Ass’n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 1992) (Compton, J., 
dissenting)) (“[B]ecause ‘plain meaning’ cannot exist in a vacuum, ambiguity is 
necessarily a creature of context. ‘As the Supreme Court has stated, “in 
ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, the court must look to the particular 
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”‘“). 
 19.  Alaska Spine Ctr., LLC v. Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr. LLC, 440 P.3d 176, 181 
(Alaska 2019) (quoting Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5, 11 
(Alaska 2014)). 
 20.  Ward v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 97–98 (Alaska 2012); see also 
Anchorage v. Brooks, 397 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) (stating a statute 
can be termed ambiguous only when its meaning remains “unresolvably [sic] 
confused”).  
 21.  See Ward, 288 P.3d at 97–98 (quoting State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 723 P.2d 85, 86 (Alaska 1986)) (“If a statute 
establishing a penalty is susceptible of more than one meaning, it should be 
construed so as to provide the most lenient penalty.”); see also De Nardo v. State, 
819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“[An ambiguous criminal] statute must 
be construed in favor of the defendant and against the government. But this rule 
of lenity or strict construction comes into play only when, after employing normal 
methods of statutory construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be ascertained 
or remains ambiguous.”). 
 22.  See Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 392, 397–99 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019); infra Part 
III. 
 23.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (2018). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, BIG GAME TAGS, 1962 TO PRESENT 
(2020), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/license/pdfs/big_game_ tags_1962-
2019.pdf (listing the number of big game tags issued each year since 1962 broken 
down by game type, year, and recipients’ residential status).  
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$45,172,155 in revenue from all big game tags.26 As important as the 
revenue generated by section 16.05.340(a)(15) is, the statute’s wider goal 
of wildlife management is framed by the Alaska Constitution’s directive 
that “wildlife . . . belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and 
maintained on the sustained yield principle.”27 
III. KINMON V. STATE 
In Kinmon, the Alaska Court of Appeals faced a deceivingly simple 
question concerning big game hunting: whether statutory requirements 
to have “previously purchas[ed]” hunting tags require the actual 
payment of money or simply “a promise to pay in the future.”28 The court 
split on this question, but the majority ultimately held that the term 
“could reasonably be construed to encompass the delivery of goods with 
a binding promise to pay in the near future.”29 
The question of statutory interpretation revolved around Mr. 
Richard Kinmon, a big game guide licensed in Alaska.30 The state charged 
and convicted Kinmon of eleven misdemeanor offenses arising out of 
hunting excursions he guided between 2009 and 2011; eight of these 
charges included offenses involving whether or not Kinmon’s clients had 
“previously purchas[ed]” statutorily required big game tags.31 Section 
16.05.340(a)(15) of the Alaska Statutes states that “[a] nonresident may not 
take a big game animal without previously purchasing a numbered, 
nontransferable, appropriate tag, issued under this paragraph.”32 At trial 
and on appeal, Kinmon argued that the term “previously purchasing” 
was ambiguous as to whether or not nonresidents must pay money before 
the hunt or simply must “promise to pay in the future.”33 
The hunting expeditions in question involved leading nonresident 
hunters on moose and sheep hunts.34 For non-Alaskans to hunt big game, 
they must submit the requisite forms to the Alaska Department of Fish 
 
 26.  ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, STATE OF ALASKA HUNT/SPORT FISH & 
GAME LICENSE GROSS REVENUE BY CALENDAR YEAR, 2011–2020 RECAP (2020), 
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/license/pdfs/1926_2019_licenses_stamps_t
ags_revenue.pdf. 
 27.  ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4. Cf. Bertil Näslund, The Principle of Sustained 
Yield and Optimal Forest Management, 79 SCANDANAVIAN J. OF ECON. 1 (1977) 
(describing a formula of forest harvesting designed to ensure long-term 
production).   
 28.  Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 392, 394 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019). 
 29.  Id. at 399. 
 30.  Id. at 394. 
 31.  Id. at 395. 
 32.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (2018). 
 33.  Kinmon, 451 P.3d at 394. 
 34.  Id. 
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and Game (“Department”).35 One of the required forms is submitted to 
the Department prior to the hunt, while another report is due to the 
Department following the actual hunting trip, regardless of the hunter’s 
success in shooting big game.36 While Kinmon was convicted on charges 
concerning three separate hunting excursions, the court of appeals 
ultimately treated these excursions differently. 
The first four charges Kinmon faced concerned a sheep hunt he 
guided in 2009 with an out-of-state hunter, John Maser.37 One of these 
charges included going on the sheep hunt “without a valid (i.e., 
“previously purchas[ed]”) nonresident sheep tag and/or harvest ticket” 
and other charges of knowingly failing to report the hunt and public 
records tampering.38 Because of Kinmon’s backdating of hunting tags, 
these convictions were upheld by the appellate court and were not altered 
by shifting interpretations of “previously purchas[ed].”39 
However, the court of appeals found stark differences between 
Maser’s hunt and Kinmon’s other disputed hunts concerning grizzly 
bears and moose with the non-Alaskans Joseph Hahn and Shelley Ailts.40 
While Hahn and Kinmon completed the requisite paperwork before 
commencing the bear hunt, Hahn did not pay for the tag until “after the 
hunt was completed,” per Kinmon’s recommendation.41 Three of the 
convictions “potentially hinged on a legal conclusion that a ‘purchase’ did 
not occur until after Hahn paid for the bear tag.”42 Kinmon pursued the 
same sort of post-payment scheme with the third hunting expedition, 
with his conviction for that hunt also turning on the correct interpretation 
of “previously purchas[ed].”43 
While the trial court determined the “commonly understood 
meaning” of “previously purchasing” was “that a ‘purchase’ did not take 
place until money changed hands,” it allowed both sides to present 
differing interpretations to the jury, with no jury instructions on the 
provided phrase.44 The court of appeals, however, disagreed with this 
procedure. The court was convinced by Kinmon’s argument that 
“purchase” had alternative meanings in other states’ hunting regulations 
worth reviewing, such as California’s relevant statutory definition of “an 
offer to buy, purchase, barter, exchange, or trade,” which the court 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 394–95. 
 37.  Id. at 395. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 400. 
 40.  Id. at 396. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 394–95. 
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contrasted with the narrower definition in Florida’s law that it found akin 
to the district court’s interpretation.45 
The court of appeals did not afford much weight to the state’s 
persuasive policy arguments.46 The crux of the State’s policy argument 
was that hunters may be less likely to pay for the hunting tags post-hunt; 
but the court, not convinced more nonresidents would shirk their 
responsibilities to actually pay for unsuccessful hunts, noted that “it [was] 
not clear that this policy interest would be undermined by allowing a 
hunter to obtain a tag before the hunt with a promise to pay at the close 
of the hunt.”47 Instead of following the trial court in “appl[ying the] 
ordinary usage” of “previously purchasing,” the appellate court held the 
term could mean nothing more than a promise to pay in the future.48 
The court also relied on its unpublished opinion in State v. Chun,49 in 
which it held that “substantial and unresolvable ambiguity in existing 
law” led to the rule of lenity being applied.50 Here, the court ruled it was 
error for the trial court to allow both parties to present competing 
definitions of “previously purchasing” and instead sided with Kinmon’s 
interpretation.51 The court of appeals then held that “previously 
purchasing” requires nothing more than “a binding promise to pay” 
under the statute.52 
Judge Harbison, however, dissented from the majority’s opinion, 
finding no statutory ambiguity in “previously purchasing.”53 Applying 
the canon of statutory construction of plain meaning, Judge Harbison 
determined that “previously purchased . . . clearly requires a nonresident 
to complete the act of purchasing a tag—including paying for it—before 
the nonresident may take a big game animal.”54 She went on to point out 
the lack of similarity between the California statute and Alaska’s, noting 
that the California statute’s term does not relate to how tags are actually 
 
 45.  Id. at 397–98 (citing CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 68, 24).  
 46.  Id. at 398. 
 47.  Id. The court pointed out that Hahn “did not directly testify that he 
thought he would not have to pay for the tag if the hunt was unsuccessful” and 
also noted that Kinmon “did testify that he told Hahn he would cover the cost of 
the tag if Hahn did not kill the bear.” Id. The court noted the same for Ailts, 
acknowledging that “the trial testimony suggested that she also believed she was 
in effect purchasing the tag at the time she filled out the paperwork to procure the 
tag.” Id. 
 48.  Id. at 401 (Harbison, J., dissenting). 
 49.  State v. Chun, 1992 WL 12153276 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (unpublished) 
(A-4283). 
 50.  Kinmon, 451 P.3d at 398 (quoting Chun, 1992 WL 12153276 at •2–3). 
 51.  Id. at 399. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 400–02 (Harbison, J., dissenting). 
 54.  Id. at 401 (emphasis added). 
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purchased.55 Going on, Judge Harbison did not find Chun persuasive due 
to the different set of codes in dispute: the present case involved Alaska’s 
statutory code, which is clear in its meaning, while the Uniform 
Commercial Code, at play in Chun, addresses when title has vested.56 The 
judge concluded her analysis of the disputed statutory term, writing that 
“[t]here is no ambiguity to the statutory requirement in Kinmon’s case 
that a nonresident hunter must ‘purchase’ an appropriate tag before taking 
the animal,” which includes paying money.57 Instead of the majority’s 
“unnecessar[y] complicat[ion of] the meaning of an unambiguous 
statute,” Judge Harbison would allow “previously purchasing” to retain 
its plain meaning within this statutory context, requiring the nonresident 
hunter who is accompanied by a guide to pay for a tag prior to the hunt 
or taking of a big game animal.58 
IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION 
The Alaska Court of Appeals wrongly decided Kinmon because of an 
erroneous interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutory phrase 
“previously purchasing” in section 16.05.340(a)(15), and improper 
consideration of statutory context and the over-arching policy of the 
statute. While future Alaska appellate courts can, and should, fix this 
judicial error, the legislature should also step in and assert that the 
purchase of big game tags must occur prior to the commencement of a 
hunt. 
Here, the court of appeals failed to provide the statutory phrase 
“previously purchasing” with its “ordinary, contemporary, [and] 
common meaning.”59 The court in Kinmon considered the dictionary 
definitions provided by the State which define purchase as “the act or 
instance of buying” and “to obtain by paying money or its equivalent,” 
both of which would clearly indicate that a “purchase” is 
contemporaneous with payment.60 In short, payment is necessary for a 
purchase to have occurred. Common sense dictates that one does not 
assert ownership of an item, such as a hunting tag, until the buyer has 
committed the act of payment. Furthermore, “previously” is a 
distinguishing mark that places the purchase of a tag prior to a future 
 
 55.  Id. “[I]nstead, California uses the term ‘procure’ to refer to the method of 
obtaining a game tag” while the term “purchase” “is used to govern the transfer 
of lawfully and unlawfully taken fish and game,” which are distinctly different 
activities. Id. 
 56.  Id. at 401–02. 
 57.  Id. at 402. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 265, 272 (Alaska 2000).  
 60.  Kinmon, 451 P.3d at 397.  
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action, such as a big game hunt. Judge Harbison noted that the statute 
“clarifies that the transaction must be complete before the animal can be 
taken.”61 A simple transaction for hunting tags should be distinguished 
from the more complex contracts that do not require previous payment, 
the latter of which Kinmon erroneously compared the former transactions 
to.62 Unlike vehicles or real estate, hunting tags are simple one-time 
transactions. Reading the phrase “previously purchasing” with its 
common understanding, the court of appeals should have held the 
hunting tag must have actually been bought before the hunt took place. 
The State is also supported by the provision’s statutory context and 
the legislature’s subsequent narrowing of the relevant statutory 
provisions. As laid out in the State’s appellee brief, this specific statutory 
provision operates within the context of the larger statutory scheme to 
“ensure sustainable big game animal populations.”63 Other Alaska 
statutes and regulations impose limitations on nonresidents conducting 
big game hunting without local guides,64 detailed instructions on big 
game hunting for religious purposes by Alaska Natives,65 and 
requirements regarding big game kill sites.66 Subsequent redrafting of the 
statutory provision in 1997  sheds  additional  light on the 
legislature’s intent to provide greater restrictions on nonresident big 
game hunting. Prior to 1997 there was no limiting language on 
nonresident big game tags in section 16.05.340(a)(15); by inserting 
the ”previously purchasing” language into the statute, the legislature 
demonstrated an intent to tighten the requirements surrounding 
nonresident big game hunting.67 Therefore, even if the court did find 
“previous purchasing” ambiguous, that ambiguity is outweighed by the 
provision’s legislative history and statutory context. Read together, these 
statutory provisions mandate the appellate court to interpret a narrower 
meaning of “previously purchasing,” which will also ensure state coffers 
receive hunting tag revenue before all hunts, weakening the opportunity 
for hunting guides to avoid purchasing tags following unsuccessful 
hunts. 
Furthermore, the Alaska Constitution provides an overarching 
purpose for managing wildlife that commands a narrower interpretation 
 
 61.  Id. at 401 (Harbison, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 62.  See id. at 398–99 (majority opinion) (noting Kinmon’s argument that 
“previously purchasing” could be interpreted to include “a binding promise to 
pay in the near future”). 
 63.  Opening Brief for Appellee State of Alaska at 1, Kinmon v. State, 451 P.3d 
392 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019) (No. A-12645). 
 64.  ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.407 (2018).  
 65.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.017 (2019); id. § 92.019 (2019).  
 66.  Id. § 92.012(e) (2019). 
 67.  Id. § 16.05.340(a)(15) (enacted in 1997). 
37.1 BLOOMFIELD MCGUIRE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2020  10:09 PM 
136 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 37:1 
of “previously purchasing.” Alaska’s detailed hunting regime, especially 
for big game hunting, exists under the constitution’s mandate that 
wildlife populations are “maintained on [a] sustained yield principle.”68 
The Alaska Supreme Court has approvingly cited to the proper definition 
of sustained yield principle proffered by the delegates of the Resources 
Committee to the state’s constitutional convention: it “denotes conscious 
application insofar as practicable of principles of management intended 
to sustain the yield of the resource being managed” and is to hold a 
“broad meaning” as used in the constitution.69 Operating under a broad 
constitutional framework to protect wildlife resources such as big game, 
the court of appeals should have interpreted “previously purchasing” in 
the light most favorable to ensuring big game populations are responsibly 
managed. Here, that would mean interpreting previously purchased as 
requiring the buying of hunting tags before a guide takes a nonresident 
on a hunt, strengthening the likelihood guides purchase tags for their 
hunts, even if they are ultimately unsuccessful. 
Not only is the statutory phrase “previously purchasing” 
unambiguous, but the “sliding scale”70 approach used in Alaska canons 
of construction require a narrower interpretation of the phrase which 
mandates tags be paid for before hunts begin. Statutory context 
(including numerous restrictions on big game hunting), the broader 
constitutional purpose of preserving sustainable wildlife population, and 
other canons of constructions all serve to strengthen rather than negate 
the provision’s lack of ambiguity.  
The policy behind requiring hunters to pay for the privilege of 
hunting regardless of the success of their expedition is simple: to ensure 
that the state receives the needed financial resources that are inherent in 
successful wildlife management. The past decade alone has seen 
nonresident tags provide ninety-seven percent of the $45,172,155 in 
revenue from big game tags.71 If the appellate court’s holding goes 
unaddressed, hunting guides can simply backdate successful big game 
hunting tags while avoiding the purchase of tags for unsuccessful hunts. 
Instead, the proper interpretation of the statute should require all big 
game hunting tags to be purchased before hunters begin an expedition, 
reducing the likelihood that unsuccessful hunters will avoid paying for 
tags. 
 
 68.  ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4.  
 69.  West v. State, 248 P.3d 689, 695 (Alaska 2010) (quoting RESOURCES 
COMMITTEE, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, TERMS (1955)). 
 70.  See Alaska Spine Ctr., LLC v. Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr. LLC, 440 P.3d 176, 
181 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5, 11 
(Alaska 2014)). 
 71.  ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, supra note 26. 
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Kinmon has unnecessarily complicated an unambiguous statute. The 
court of appeals failed to perform any statutory interpretation besides 
deciphering plain meaning, ignoring statutory context, narrowing of 
subsequent iterations, and the over-arching purpose of the statute buoyed 
by the Alaska Constitution. The legislature can and should address this 
judicial error. By clarifying section 16.05.340(a)(15) as requiring the 
buying of a hunting tag before the hunt, the legislature can remedy this 
erroneous interpretation of the statute. To this end, section 
16.05.340(a)(15) should be amended to read as follows, with the proposed 
changes emphasized: 
A nonresident may not take a big game animal without 
purchasing, prior to the commencement of a hunt, a numbered, 
nontransferable, appropriate tag, issued under this paragraph. 
The tag must be affixed to the animal before leaving the kill site 
and must remain affixed until the animal is prepared for storage, 
consumed, or exported. A tag issued but not used for an animal 
may be used to satisfy the tagging requirement for an animal of 
any other species for which the tag fee is of equal or less value. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Kinmon, the court of appeals not only erred in its interpretation of 
the plain meaning of “previously purchasing” in section 16.05.340(a)(15) 
of the Alaska Statutes, it also neglected to account for the policy 
ramifications of its interpretation. This two-part error has left Alaska’s 
statutory scheme regulating hunting weakened and less able to achieve 
its intended purpose. To rectify this error, the Alaska legislature should 
amend the language of section 16.05.340(a)(15) to clarify that the purchase 
of big game tags must occur prior to the commencement of a hunt. This 
change will allow the state to more effectively protect the practice of 
hunting from unscrupulous and unlawful actors. Hunting, a cultural 
pillar of Alaska, demands legal protection of a quality commensurate 
with its importance to the state’s socio-economic identity. 
